A “Sybil attack” is the oldest game in on-chain markets: one person, many wallets, one disproportionate share of the prize pool. Most bracket pools, prediction sites, and tournament products have no defense against it. Auora does.Documentation Index
Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.auora.gg/llms.txt
Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.
In tournaments
Tournament entrants commit their entire bracket upfront, anchored by a single sealed cryptographic commitment, before the first game is played. After the tournament starts, no entrant — across any number of wallets — can change their picks based on new information. Combined with path-dependent scoring, this breaks the wallet-spam economy:- Spinning up 50 wallets costs 50 entry fees. Sybils pay for their own attack.
- Each of those 50 wallets must commit a complete bracket before round one. You cannot wait to see how round one plays out and then “decide” your round-two picks across 50 wallets — your picks across all wallets are locked the moment the tournament starts.
- Random “spread” brackets score badly. Path-dependent scoring means your later picks only count if your earlier picks were also right. A scattershot strategy across many wallets produces many wallets with mostly-broken brackets, not many wallets with high scores.
